Beyond elections : perceptions of democracy in four Arab countries by Teti, Andrea et al.
For Peer Review Only
Beyond Elections: Perceptions of Democracy in Four Arab 
Countries
Journal: Democratization
Manuscript ID FDEM-2018-0168.R2
Manuscript Type: Original Article
Keywords: Democracy, Survey Research, Economic Rights, Arab Region, Values, Attitudes
 
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fdem  Email: Aurel.Croissant@urz.uni-heidelberg.de;Jeffhaynes106868@aol.com
Democratization
For Peer Review Only
1
Beyond Elections: Perceptions of Democracy in Four Arab Countries
Abstract
This article draws on public opinion survey data from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan to 
investigate first, whether a ‘demand for democracy’ in the region exists; second, how to 
measure it; and third, how respondents understand it. The picture emerging from this analysis 
is complex, eluding the simple dichotomy between prima facie support and second order 
incongruence with democracy which characterises current debates: respondents have a more 
holistic understanding of democracy than is found in current scholarship or indeed pursued by 
Western or regional policymakers, valuing civil-political rights but prioritising socio-economic 
rights; there is broad consensus behind principles of gender equality, but indirect questions 
reveal the continuing influence of conservative and patriarchal attitudes; respondents value 
religion, but do not trust religious leaders or want them to meddle in elections or government; 
and while there is broad support for conventionally-understood pillars of liberal democracy 
(free elections, a parliamentary system), there is also a significant gap between those who 
support democracy as the best political system in principle and those who also believe it is 
actually suitable for their country.
Key words: democracy; survey research; economic rights; Arab region; values; attitudes
Introduction
The Arab Uprisings raised the possibility that popular pressure might translate into democratic 
transformations. Both this initial anti-authoritarian impulse and the subsequent absence of 
democratic transitions reignited debates about democratization, modernization, and 
‘authoritarian resilience’. In particular, the Uprisings reignited debates over whether there is a 
‘demand for democracy’ in the Arab Middle East, what people mean by democracy, and what 
the nature of ‘barriers to democracy’ is in the region. Current scholarship is split: some suggest 
consistently positive responses to direct questions about the desirability of democracy indicate 
that a demand for democracy exists and is robust; others counter that this test is insufficient, 
and that ‘second-order’ correlates of democracy – ‘self-expression values’1 – are inextricable 
from democracy and that these are insufficiently present in the region to speak of a demand for 
democracy, much less to allow it to consolidate. 
This article draws on both direct and indirect questions relevant to respondents’ conceptions of 
democracy such as have been used in existing scholarship, but also includes an expanded range 
of relevant survey data. This allows us, inter alia, to avoid assumptions about which questions 
Page 1 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fdem  Email: Aurel.Croissant@urz.uni-heidelberg.de;Jeffhaynes106868@aol.com
Democratization
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
2
are more significant indicators of democracy – particularly whether overt or attitudinal 
questions should be prioritised – or about respondents’ understanding of either questions or of 
democracy itself. Instead, this approach allows us to focus on making sense of the answers 
respondents actually give. From this perspective, democracy becomes a signifier which survey 
data can help us to reconstruct the structure in the collective imagination.
Due consideration of this data suggests that existing debates are oversimplified, and that 
beneath the apparent contradiction between overt support for and attitudinal incompatibility 
with democracy, respondents display a broader and deeper conception of democracy than 
existing scholarship allows for. Specifically, first, our analysis confirms the tension between 
evidence for a ‘demand for democracy’ when respondents are asked outright about whether 
this is the best system of government, and significantly weaker actual display of democratic 
attitudes, as revealed by selected co-requisites of democracy such as gender equality. However, 
deeper analysis of available data also shows that these results are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, but might better be conceived as facets of a more complex relation to democracy 
which respondents display. Second, we show that while in respondents’ understanding of 
democracy civil-political rights are often secondary to socio-economic rights and to corruption, 
there is also support for the formal institutions of an open parliamentary democracy. Third, 
although respondents do display conservative values and attitudes incompatible with liberal 
democracy on both gender and the relation between religion and politics, their conceptions of 
the role of religion in politics does not translate into a demand for a religious state or for 
religious leadership. 
Analytical Background: Current Debates on Democratization
The debate about why Arab countries have not democratised, both before and after the Arab 
uprisings2 focuses on structural3 or cultural4 reasons, and despite recognising that stable 
democracies require a mass demand for it, the debate on whether this demand exists in the 
‘Arab region’ rarely considers the views of Arab citizens themselves.5 
Public opinion survey data for the Middle East, which became available from the World 
Values Survey (WVS) and the Arab Barometer (AB) in the 2000s, makes it possible to probe 
whether such a demand exists. It suggests that demand for democracy is strong, at least in 
principle.6 However, the nature and significance of this demand is strongly debated. On the one 
hand, Tessler and others emphasize that there is a strong demand for democracy and that, 
whatever barriers there are, these are not values/attitudes (e.g. religion).7 Inglehart and others, 
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however, question the ‘depth’ of this support, arguing that democracy requires overt support 
but also proper institutional practices (a ‘supply of democracy’), both secular-rational values 
necessary for electoral democracy and the self-expression attitudes with which democratic 
consolidation is correlated.8 Their analysis of WVS data suggests citizens in Arab states do not 
display such ‘second order’ attitudes,9 particularly gender equality10 – a strong correlate of 
established liberal democracy –, religious freedom,11 and secular values.12
However, in focusing either on ‘first-order’ responses or on ‘second-order’ correlates 
of democracy, both arguments miss the complexity in respondents’ beliefs. Certainly, it is 
problematic simply to dismiss prima facie evidence entirely. For example, findings from 
surveys across countries and over time show that only a small minority of Arab citizens believe 
Islam and democracy are incompatible13 and that they reject unelected religious leaders making 
political decisions.14 Secondly, evidence suggests that support for religion in politics and 
government has declined.15 Thirdly, a large majority of respondents believe in racial tolerance 
and religious tolerance, support women working outside the home, and support having 
politicians with a range of political views (authors’ own analysis, ABII dataset). Fourthly, most 
Muslims worldwide actually live in democracies, putting paid to claims of incompatibility in 
principle between Islam and democracy.16 Finally, non-Western types of democracy – 
specifically, systems accommodating Arab and/or Islamic values – are indeed theoretically 
possible.17 On this evidence, the region’s lack of transitions toward democracy cannot so easily 
be imputed to social constructs such as ethnicities, nationalities or religion.18
The data presented here offer an updated and richer picture of public demand for 
democracy in four Arab countries, how democracy is perceived there, and what kind of values 
they prioritise. What emerges is a picture more complex than either ‘side’ has thus far 
acknowledged.
Methods 
This article uses data for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia taken from the Arab Barometer 
IV (ABIV) public opinion survey carried out in the Spring of 2016, from the Arab 
Transformations (AT) survey carried out in late 2014 and from Arab Barometer III (ABIII), 
carried out in 2013. We employ data from the three surveys to make use of questions that were 
not asked in the other surveys. Where identical or almost identical questions were asked, we 
use Arab Barometer IV data as the most up-to-date. 
The four countries are relatively stable and are representative of different post-
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Uprisings trajectories, providing therefore greater data reliability and different contexts and 
experiences for citizens. Tunisia is the only country recognised as having transitioned to 
democracy and currently displays the institutional characteristics of established Western 
democracies.19 Egypt’s tentative moves towards democratisation ended in a military take-over 
and the return of a highly autocratic system in July 2013.20 For their part, the Jordanian and 
Moroccan regimes responded to the Uprisings with a mix of cosmetic concessions, co-optation 
and repression.21  Despite the differences between our four countries, which suggest a need for 
caution with facile generalisation across ‘the Arab region’, some themes – e.g. the roots of the 
Uprisings and the dissatisfaction of citizens with their governments22 – are recognisably similar 
across countries with such diverse systems and recent political experiences. These similarities 
in the face of diversity suggests that other Arab countries might also present similar profiles 
if/when data become available.
Local teams carried out the AT and AB surveys using common questionnaires with 
face-to-face interviews conducted in local Arabic dialects.23 The surveys were based on a 
national probability sample design of adults aged 18 or older, with sample sizes adequate to 
generalise with a degree of precision at country level and relatively high response rates (Table 
1). Respondents were selected randomly at household level. 
Table 1: Sample size and response rates for Arab Barometers III and IV and Arab 
Transformations Surveys 
AT AB III AB IV
Sample Response 
Rate
Sample Response 
Rate
Sample Response 
Rate
Egypt 1524 89.2% 1196 na 1200 66%
Jordan 2139 99.3% 1795 na 1200 80%
Morocco 1777 93.9% 1116 na 1200 59%
Tunisia 1215 na 1199 na 1200 56%
Notes: sample size is after removal of duplicates, AB4 sample for Jordan excludes refugee sample
It is generally accepted that survey quality in middle- and low-income countries is good 
enough for the measurement of national-level subjective orientations.24 In addition, we took 
steps to deal with two common data-quality issues. First, we used PercentMatch,25 to identify 
cases where there was a possibility of fraud by either duplication/near-duplication (excessive 
similarity) or random completion (excessive variance) of the questionnaire, and we excluded 
these data.26 Secondly, we included ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ answers in the analysis when 
these could be considered valid responses. The latter are noticeable on the questions on 
democracy and regime type, especially in Egypt and Tunisia in the Arab Transformations 
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Survey. They also vary significantly by country and by question. Given that data collectors are 
trained to encourage respondents to give a substantive response and are instructed not to read 
‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ as optional responses, respondents have to be genuinely determined 
not to select one of the options offered even if they are not certain or none of the options fits 
what they think. The normal practice is to exclude these answers and use only data where there 
is a ‘substantive’ response. This assumes that attitudes of those excluded are randomly 
distributed across the population. However, this is unlikely to be the case.27 Moreover, 
whatever the reason for the ‘don’t know’ responses, if they are discounted then the proportions 
of respondents who support democracy or a particular regime type will almost certainly be 
overestimated. We have followed the normal convention of combining ‘agree’ and ‘strongly 
agree’ responses as indicating support, although this may not adequately measure their degree 
of commitment.
Findings
Before discussing the results in greater detail, the internal diversity of the four countries should 
be noted: significant differences emerge, and while global studies of attitudes and values often 
identify the Arab world as distinct from others, these four countries are very far from displaying 
homogenous attitudes, with Tunisia and Morocco having less ‘conservative’ attitudes than 
Egypt and Jordan on several issues. 
The Prima Facie Demand for Democracy 
Arab Transformations data confirm that there still remained strong support for democracy as 
the ‘best system of government despite its faults’ in late 2014 (Jordan: 89.8%; Morocco: 
80.3%; Tunisia: 77.7%; Egypt: 61.3%).28 Support for democracy was lowest in Egypt, but it 
should be noted that a very high 34% of respondents answered ‘don’t know’ and that the timing 
of the survey (late 2014) coincided with strong internal repression of dissent and still high 
consensus behind Sisi’s military-dominated regime.29 Given the climate of repression and that 
most Brotherhood supporters themselves invoked democratic legitimacy – their victories in 
2012 parliamentary and presidential elections widely regarded as the country’s freest – it is 
possible that ‘don’t know’ respondents may have included Brotherhood supporters. In Jordan, 
the resilience of authoritarianism in the face of widespread protests and the lack of economic 
improvement may explain the enthusiasm – at least in principle – for democracy. In Morocco, 
a modicum of reform might also have contributed to avoiding disillusion. In Tunisia this 
Page 5 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fdem  Email: Aurel.Croissant@urz.uni-heidelberg.de;Jeffhaynes106868@aol.com
Democratization
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
6
support might be explained through the success of free and fair elections and the hope that the 
government of national unity would deliver on the economy.30 
Dimensions of Democracy: Procedural vs. Substantive
The nearest surveys currently get to inferring what people understand by democracy is to ask 
respondents to select from a list what they think its two most important characteristics are. In 
the AT survey, this list included changing governments through elections, political rights 
(freedom to criticize government, political equality among citizens), economic rights 
(narrowing economic inequalities, providing for basic necessities, full employment) and the 
absence of corruption. Citizens do not appear to believe that civil-political rights alone are the 
core of democracy. For example, they do not agree that people having the right to vote for their 
leaders is one of the two most important characteristics of democracy: support for this was only 
16% in Egypt, and at its highest, in Tunisia, it was noticeably under half. Nor is there strong 
support for political rights associated with liberal democracy as essential. Citizens were more 
concerned with issues pertaining to socio-economic rights and to ‘clean’ government, i.e. the 
eradication of corruption. Support for these as essential characteristics of democracy is as high 
as or higher than for elections. 
FIGURE 1 HERE
Note: Don’t know/refused: 26.4% Egypt, 0.7% Jordan, 0.6% Morocco, 1% Tunisia.
ABIV data also suggest that citizens generally see issues pertaining to economic rights as more 
important in defining democracy than civil-political and social rights. Asked to select the most 
essential characteristic of democracy from four possible characteristics in three separate 
questions, citizens consistently prioritised economic rights over civil-political ones (see Figure 
2). Moreover, the importance citizens attach to employment opportunities is evident, as it is 
the only economic option, with government ensuring law and order being the second mostly 
chosen option (12.3% Egypt, 25.8% Jordan, 31.2% Morocco, 22.7% Tunisia). 
FIGURE 2 HERE
Source: ABIV.
While superficially this may seem to support modernization scholars’ suspicion of the genuine 
depth of the Arab demand for democracy, inferring the significance of such a breadth of 
priorities is not straightforward. It may make the citizens in the four countries more prepared 
to accept an ‘authoritarian social contract,’ conferring legitimacy on any regime that is able to 
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deliver socio-economic goods. However, valuing socio-economic rights as much as or more 
than political-civil rights does not mean citizens are driven only by instrumental pursuit of 
material gains.31 Respondents may simply have a broader conception of democracy than a 
narrow procedural one.32 Equally, respondents’ focus on socio-economic rights and conditions 
might be the result of prioritisation.33 Alternatively, they might be a by-product of ‘façade 
democracy fatigue’: despite decades of regime propaganda, citizens are well aware that civil-
political rights and elections are guaranteed in little more than name, making it possible that 
citizens might rationally prioritise concrete outcomes.34 It is also possible that respondents 
might associate substantive conditions – particularly economic redistribution – with 
democracy, either as a material outcome they believe democracy should bring or out of the 
principled belief that a modicum of social justice is necessary in order for civil-political rights 
to be exercised effectively and therefore for democracy to function.
Unfortunately, one of the limitations of existing survey data is that it is not possible to 
identify the rationale behind respondents’ association between democracy and socio-economic 
rights and conditions. That said, evidence suggests that while there is indeed support for 
democracy in principle, it is not safe to assume that respondents and survey designers share 
the same conception of democracy: respondents have a much broader conception of it than 
survey designers, encompassing both civil-political and socio-economic rights. Indeed, 
evidence suggests increasingly that words like ‘democracy’ may not have the same meaning 
when citizens live in ‘façade democracies’35 and that it is necessary to draw on complementary 
qualitative evidence to clarify such points.36
These results might also suggest a re-evaluation of the debate over the relative 
importance of material conditions in affecting the practical likelihood of democracy emerging 
or being sustained, compared to factors such access to plural/uncensored information37 or the 
importance of elements underestimated in modernization theory such as the reduction of 
inequalities or the provision of basic services, including education.38
Examining Self-Expression Values: Do Religious Values and Conceptions of Gender Act as 
Barriers to Democratization?
The question of the ‘compatibility’ between Islam and democracy has been central to the debate 
on Middle Eastern politics for decades. As discussed above, there remains a strong division 
between those arguing that Arabs want democracy and do not see any incompatibility between 
it and Islam and those who argue that Arab lack ‘second-order’ secular-rational and self-
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expression values which are believed to be necessary for transformation towards and 
stabilization of democracy.
Religion and Politics
What emerges from a closer scrutiny of the data is a considerably more complex picture. First, 
a majority of respondents believe there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and 
democracy and religion is not an obstacle to understanding and practicing democracy. 
According to ABIV, a clear majority reject the view that democracy is a Western form of 
government incompatible with Islam (Egypt: 71%; Jordan: 79%; Morocco: 67%: Tunisia: 
60%). Furthermore, AT data show that only a minority think their country would be improved 
by religious people holding public office (Egypt: 24.2%; Jordan: 34.9%; Morocco: 39.1%; 
Tunisia: 24%), disproving the notion that voting for Islamist parties necessarily means calling 
for clerical rule. Indeed, AT data also show that half or more of the respondents want a 
government where clerics do not influence decisions (Egypt: 65.7%; Jordan: 50.2%; Morocco: 
58.6%; Tunisia: 74.5%). Overall, respondents’ clear preference is for democracy with no 
clerical influence, with the notable exception of Jordan where the difference between ‘secular’ 
and ‘religious’ democracy is small (Figure 3). However, only in Tunisia does an outright 
majority favour a democracy with no clerical influence; in the other countries, support stands 
at just under 50%. In Egypt, it is noticeable that 44.9% answered ‘don’t know’, again possibly 
a reflection of the repression of all opposition groups since 2013-14.
FIGURE 3 HERE
Source: AT.
Note: Classification derived from “A democratic system may have its problems, yet it is better than other 
systems,” and “Religious clerics should have influence over the decisions of government” (reversed).
However, rejecting religious clerics’ political influence or the possibility of their holding office 
is not necessarily the same as accepting conventional notions of secularism, i.e. of the 
separation between religion and politics. Indeed, evidence outlined below suggests a 
considerable portion of the population does not reject the notion that ‘Islamic’ precepts should 
govern society. Using only survey data to disentangle respondents’ attitudes on this front is 
particularly difficult, but it appears that respondents invoke religious principles to frame calls 
for (different kinds of) political, economic and social reform.39
Only in Tunisia do a majority of citizens strongly agree that religion is a private matter 
that should be separated from socio-economic life, and even then this majority is only just over 
50% (ABIV data). In Jordan and Morocco, even when ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ responses 
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are combined, only a minority agrees: 32% in Jordan and 43% in Morocco. In Egypt, combined 
agreement/strong agreement suggests a clear majority agree (65.7%). These seemingly 
contradictory findings are the product of unique local factors and the way in which religion has 
been – or has not been – part of public discourse and institutions since independence.40 Indeed, 
some argue that the demand for shari‘a actually reflects the use of religious rhetoric to pursue 
social justice.41 Thus, one indicator that stands out is the overwhelming support for legislation 
being ‘based on shari’a’, with only a tiny proportion of citizens thinking all laws should be 
based on the will of the people (Figure 4). 
FIGURE 4 HERE
Source: ABIV
There is a tendency to equate respondents’ preferences for ‘religious values’ with conservative 
values incompatible with democracy. A close scrutiny of survey data, however, suggests a 
more complex picture. On the one hand, the vast majority of citizens think that shari’a should 
be a key source of law in lieu of, alongside or as the expression of the will of the people. ABIII 
data shows a significant majority in all four countries (between 70% and 75%) agreeing that 
the Constitution should mandate shari’a as the main – albeit not the only – source of law. On 
the other hand, the data outlined above clearly shows considerable lack of trust in religious 
leaders and a distinct disagreement with the notion that such leaders should have political roles. 
In addition, it should be emphasised that what exactly respondents understand by shari’a – or 
indeed Islam – is hard to assess given the diverse versions and understandings across time and 
place42 and also the difficulties in using survey data to explore the meanings respondents attach 
to their answers and indeed the questions,43 
Perhaps a more plausible conclusion is that while respondents have little confidence in 
religious leaders and do not wish to see them influencing elections or government, a legislative 
framework broadly inspired by religious principles is perceived to be desirable. It should be 
noted that socially and politically conservative values expressed under the rubric of religion 
are a barrier to the development of liberal democracy but not necessarily electoral 
democracy.44 
Gender Equality
There is a similar apparent contradiction in public opinion on gender equality, support for 
which revised modernization theory argues is the best indicator of self-expression values. On 
this count, Arab countries are among the least gender-friendly in the world45. There are two 
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caveats to this, though. First, inferring on this basis that these values are inherently linked to 
Islam would entail claiming that a cultural construct such as a religion is monolithic and 
unchangeable, which is clearly not the case. Other studies suggest, more convincingly, that 
entrenched patriarchy is to blame for anti-democratic attitudes.46 Secondly, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents support gender equality being mandated in their country’s 
constitution,47 and clear majorities in each country agree that women should have equal rights 
in education and that married women should be able to have paid employment if they so wish 
(Figure 5).
FIGURE 5 HERE
Source: ABIV.
Nevertheless, respondents’ views should be considered in their totality when it comes to 
gender equality. Although respondents’ commitment to gender equality is strong in principle 
in some respects, it is not in others. A majority of citizens agree that husbands should have the 
final say in all decisions concerning the family and that men make better politicians than 
women, albeit less so in Morocco (56%) and Tunisia (55%) than in Egypt (78.4%) and Jordan 
(74.2%) (Figure 5). In addition, when citizens were asked in ABIII (2013) and in AT (2014) if 
family law should be based on shari’a or if they supported equal rights, there was strong 
support for the former.48
Although not central to this article’s argument, it is worth noting that on a 16-point index 
of Gender Equality computed from the four questions shown in Figure 5 – with 1 being the 
lowest possible score – there was a significant difference in mean scores across the countries 
(Anova sig p<0.001). The Scheffé procedure showed three homogeneous sub groups: Tunisia 
and Morocco the least conservative (mean 10), Jordan second (mean 9.4) and Egypt third 
(mean 8.8). There was also a significant difference in mean scores between men and women 
with women being less conservative (Egypt 9.5/8.2, Jordan 20.2/8.7, Morocco 11/9, Tunisia 
11/9.5).
As with the relationship between Islam and democracy analysed above, the complexity 
and incongruences in data on religion and gender cannot warrant the conclusion that Islam is 
incompatible with gender equality: the data merely show that respondents associate 
conservative values with Islam in this particular respect.49 Survey data cannot be used to infer 
anything more than a contingent association, and here they certainly do not suggest there is a 
causal or necessary relation between Islam and patriarchy. This ambiguity in survey data also 
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points to the need to draw on complementary qualitative evidence to clarify such points.
Probing Further: What more can survey data tell us about respondents’ conceptions of 
Democracy?
Survey data offer additional opportunities to probe respondents’ conceptions of the institutional 
form and substantive content of democracy, which have thus far been under-examined. This 
section outlines respondents’ preferences regarding regime type, their perception of whether 
the rights nominally afforded to them can actually be practiced and whether they think 
democracy is not only desirable in principle but also suitable for their respective countries.
Taking due account of variability between countries, our analysis above suggests that 
what people want is a form of government that, in addition to having free and fair democratic 
elections. guarantees socio-economic rights and conditions, is not corrupt, and has at least some 
laws based on religious principles, albeit without religious clerics having a direct role in 
government decisions and elections. However, given the way survey questions are phrased, it 
is important to note that demand for democracy in principle cannot be strictly equated with 
demanding democracy for one’s own country. For example, some might not think fellow 
citizens are ready for it and are unwilling to ‘risk’ free elections as they might deliver an 
authoritarian government or a populist one that would further destabilise the country. Some 
might doubt the importance of civil-political rights – and thus of free and fair elections – in 
highly corrupt political systems which have a rhetoric of rights but systematically undermine 
them in practice. Certainly, citizens do not believe political leaders are concerned about their 
needs: less than a third in Egypt (31%) and Jordan (30.5%), and only around a fifth in Morocco 
(20.5%) and Tunisia (22.9%) (ABIV data), despite these leaders being elected. Nor do citizens 
think their countries are currently democratic or near-democratic (i.e. scoring at least 8/10 on 
a 10-point scale), with all countries scoring less than 40% (Morocco: 7.3%; Egypt: 11.6%; 
Tunisia: 19.2%; and Jordan: 39.5% - ABIV data). Indeed, despite a broad consensus among 
international actors that Tunisia is a democracy, only a very small proportion of Tunisian 
respondents agree. This suggests that Tunisians have a rather different understanding of what 
a democratic system is, how it should function and what it should deliver. At the very least 
their lived experience leads them to value more than just democracy’s institutional trappings. 
In assessing the conception of democracy citizens in these four countries hold and in 
considering the prospects for and barriers against democracy in the region, it is therefore 
important to take into account both principles and institutional forms of democracy on the one 
hand and its substance, the effective exercise of those rights on the other. 
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Democracy I: Institutional Forms
ABIV asks respondents how suitable each of six regime types is for their country, without any 
explicit reference to democracy or other regime type - namely:
1. A parliamentary system in which only non-religious parties compete (secular electoral 
democracy);
2. A parliamentary system in which nationalists, left wing, right wing, and Islamist parties 
compete (open electoral democracy);
3. A system in which only Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections (Islamic 
parliament);
4. A system where a strong authority makes decisions without considering electoral 
results or the opinions of the opposition (façade democracy/authoritarian);
5. A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections 
(Islamic authority). 
6. A system that provides for the needs of its citizens without giving them the right to 
participate in the political process (patrimonial/authoritarian).
Electoral democracy was the system most frequently seen as suitable in all countries, with an 
open electoral system most frequently nominated in each case – although only in Morocco did 
a majority nominate it (Figure 6). However, half or more nominated a secular and/or open 
democracy in Egypt (50.6%), Morocco (68.3%) and Tunisia (58.3%), while only 41% did so 
in Jordan. Other options were generally viewed less favourably. There is not much support for 
‘Islamic’ government, which less than a third of respondents nominated: 30% in Jordan and 
Morocco and 24% in Tunisia see an Islamic parliament and/or an Islamic authority figure as 
suitable for their country, falling to 12% in Egypt. By contrast, there is noticeable support for 
non-Islamic authoritarian government in Tunisia, both for façade democracy and for a 
patrimonial system, with 39.9% of citizens agreeing that one and/or the other was suitable for 
them. In Egypt (22.2%) and Jordan (21.6%) just over a fifth also agree with one and/or the 
other of these options, falling to 14% in Morocco. 
FIGURE 6 HERE
Source: ABIV.
Note: 15.2% of Egyptians did not select any of the options as suitable/very suitable for their country, 9.5% of 
Jordanians, 7.3% Moroccans and 2.9% of Tunisians. 11.8% of Egyptians, 4.1% of Jordanians, 2.2% of 
Moroccans and 1.1% of Tunisians answered ‘don’t now’ to all six questions. 
Regime types other than open democracy were rejected as unsuitable by a majority of citizens.
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Democracy II: Suitability in Principle and in Practice
Citizens’ responses to questions on the suitability of democracy for their country, as opposed 
to their support for it generally, further complicate this picture. One limitation of drawing only 
on responses on the suitability of democracy in principle is that one might rationally believe 
democracy to be ‘the best system in principle’ but also believe democracy is not suitable for 
the particular country, either in general or at the time of asking. 
Indeed, despite the high support for democracy in principle, ABIV data shows citizens 
are much less likely to agree democracy is always preferable to other types of government: this 
agreement is highest in Morocco at 68%, lowest in Jordan at 41% and hovers around half in 
Egypt – well below respondents seeing it as the best form of government in principle (Table 
1). This suggests that in Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, between two and three respondents in 
ten saw democracy as desirable in principle but not for their countries.50 The reasons for these 
answers are of course important, as they might represent genuine instrumental concerns (e.g. 
large Islamist blocs such as the 2012-2013 Brotherhood-Salafi alliance in Egypt which ran 
roughshod over the concerns of secularists, liberals and leftists) or might be rooted in belief in 
a cultural incompatibility (e.g. incompatibility of democracy and religion, or class divisions). 
In any case, while a majority of citizens say they think democracy is the best system of 
government in principle, by 2016 demand for electoral democracy as the preferred system of 
government had significantly dropped in all countries surveyed (Table 2). This demand falls 
further when counting only those who both think that electoral democracy is suitable for their 
country and reject other types of regimes (i.e. select only one preferred system). Only in Tunisia 
do a slight majority of citizens perceive electoral democracy as the only suitable form of 
government for their country; in Egypt and Morocco this drops below a third and in Jordan it 
falls to a fifth. 
Table 2: Demand for Democracy in Principle and for Respondents’ Countries (%)
Country Democracy 
best system 
despite its 
faults 2014
Electoral 
democracy 
suitable for 
country in 
20161 
Electoral 
democracy 
only system 
suitable for 
country in 
20162
Difference 
between 
cols 1 & 2
Differenced 
between cols 
1&3 
Egypt 61.3 50.6 31.3 9.7 30.0
Jordan 88.8 41.0 20.6 47.8 61.0
Morocco 80.3 68.3 34.0 12.0 46.0
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Tunisia 77.7 58.3 52.8 19.4 24.9
Sources: AT, ABIV.
Notes: 1 secular and/or open democracy seen as suitable for country; 2 secular and/or open democracy seen as 
suitable for country and all other regime types seen as unsuitable.
It is difficult from survey data alone to infer the rationales behind these responses. 
Certainly, for countries where the question was asked, there were noticeably different views 
about how prepared citizens are for democracy. In Tunisia, a clear majority agreed citizens 
were not prepared (73%), while in Jordan 64.2% and Morocco 56.6% disagreed (the question 
was not asked in Egypt). Another possible interpretation is that respondents do not think their 
countries have the institutional infrastructure to support democracy or to hold free and fair 
elections at the time of asking. This might be compatible with the fact that only a minority trust 
political parties, civil society or indeed the mass media – although according to ABIV data, 
except for Morocco (44%) a majority of citizens did think that the most recent parliamentary 
elections were mainly free and fair (Egypt: 65.8%; Jordan: 54.3%; Tunisia: 59.2%).
This differential between ‘principled’ and ‘actual’ approval of democracy is interesting 
for two reasons. First, it suggests the possibility that non-democratic political systems 
delivering material and moral goods which citizens expect might enjoy a reasonably high 
degree of legitimacy. Second, similar differentials transpire from data on countries outside the 
Arab region, including established Western democracies, countering the idea that what citizens 
in some Arab countries think about democracy is somehow exceptional.51 
Democracy III: Having and Exercising Rights
While citizens may prioritise issues pertaining to socio-economic rights over those pertaining 
to civil-political rights, respondents also believe the latter should be constitutionally 
guaranteed. Support for guaranteeing workers’ rights is the strongest, and the one issue 
connected to an economic right in the list of options – namely, that the constitution should 
guarantee social protection for the poor – was supported by over 90% of citizens in each of the 
four countries. In some ways this also confirms the idea of the centrality of socio-economic 
rights to respondents’ priorities even in constitutional matters. The lowest support across the 
countries is for keeping the army beyond politics although here nearly three quarters think the 
constitution should guarantee this (Figure 7). 
FIGURE 7 HERE
Source: ABIV.
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It is noticeable that respondents also do not believe they can fully exercise political and civil 
rights in practice despite many of them being nominally enshrined in laws or constitutions 
(Figure 8). Many such rights are essential to a functioning electoral democracy: being unable 
to exercise them effectively reduces democracy to little more than a façade, confirming the 
well-established literature describing several regional autocracies as ‘hybrid regimes’. This 
perception is congruent with the possibility that respondents’ focus on socio-economic rights 
and conditions might be a rational choice in a context in which those civil-political rights – 
which even in liberal, procedural notions of democracy are supposed to afford citizens the 
possibility of selecting politicians who will focus on socio-economic rights and conditions – 
have effectively been voided.
FIGURE 8 HERE
Source: ABIII.
Here, as with socio-economic rights, it is interesting to note that only around a third of 
Tunisians feel they are actually able to exercise these rights – again marginally higher than in 
the other countries despite Tunisia being the post-2011 democratic success story. Perhaps 
Tunisians have become aware that the exercise of many rights is linked to socio-economic 
success, much as many ordinary citizens in established democracies see socio-economic 
inequalities as undermining their rights.52
Conclusions
This article helps refine our understanding of the ‘demand for democracy’ and thus informs the 
debate on prospects for democratic transformations in four countries of the Arab Middle East 
after the 2010-2011 uprisings. Indirectly, it also helps reflect on the nature and relative 
importance of ‘barriers to democracy’ in these states.
First, our analysis confirms the apparent tension between strong evidence for a ‘demand 
for democracy’ on the one hand when respondents are asked outright about whether democracy 
is the best system of government despite its flaws, and on the other hand a significantly weaker 
actual display of democratic attitudes as revealed by selected indicators of co-requisites of 
democracy such as gender equality. While current scholarship presents these as mutually 
exclusive, our analysis suggests both might be facets of a more complex and ambiguous 
relation to democracy which respondents display.
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Second, it emerges that respondents do not prioritise the civil-political rights in the 
definition of democracy that are central to orthodox models of democracy and democratization, 
at least relative to other factors. ‘First generation rights’ undoubtedly remain important, but 
respondents have a significantly broader and more substantive conception of democracy 
compared to the narrow, procedural definition adopted in most democracy indicators and most 
models of democratization. This finding is congruent with the centrality of socio-economic 
inequalities in the Arab uprisings.53 In particular, while respondents prioritise matters 
pertaining to socio-economic rights and conditions – e.g. redistributive outcomes, 
constitutional guarantees for workers, an end to corruption – they also support the formal 
institutions of an open parliamentary democracy. It seems significant in this respect that 
respondents also feel their civil-political rights are often nominal: decades of ‘façade 
democracy’ and politicians’ broken promises may well have driven respondents to prioritise 
socio-economic over civil-political rights.
Third, respondents in the cases we consider display conservative values and attitudes 
on both gender and the relation between religion and politics such as are incompatible with 
liberal democracy. However, respondents’ conceptions of the relation between Islam and 
politics suggests a more complex dynamic: while respondents did want ‘more religion’ in 
public life – particularly in guaranteeing social justice – they also want less religious 
leadership; they did not trust clerics much, nor did they want them to have a say either in 
elections or in government decisions. On balance, considering also respondents’ preferences 
for political regimes and their conceptions of democracy and of national priorities, this suggests 
that religion might be the rubric under which to pursue greater social as well as political justice.
Finally, the article probed survey data further by drawing on questions pertaining to 
both the procedural form of democracy and its practical substance. Responses on issues of 
institutional design and the suitability of democracy for respondents’ countries suggest a 
complex relation to the idea and practice of democracy. In particular, only a minority think that 
democracy is suitable for their country in 2014. Further research is necessary to understand 
this ‘gap’. 
The results presented here also entail several methodological and analytical 
implications. The complexities and ambiguities revealed by careful scrutiny of survey data help 
provide a more complete and nuanced picture of citizens’ political preferences, and although it 
is beyond the scope of this article, acknowledging such complexity both in the region and 
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beyond54 is an important step towards a less ‘exceptionalist’ view of the Arab Middle East and 
towards a more nuanced globally comparative analysis of conceptions of democracy. Secondly, 
this complexity helps suggest other ways of using survey data to explore existing scholarship, 
raising the possibility of confirming some existing models (e.g. hybrid democracies) or 
challenging others (e.g. the binary opposition between religious values and democracy). 
Thirdly, at a methodological level, the limitations of survey data generally and of current 
questionnaire design specifically both suggest ways in which questionnaire design might be 
amended and the underline the importance of complementing survey data with qualitative data, 
the semantic richness of which has the advantage of affording insights into the rationales 
behind respondents’ answers which are impossible through survey data alone. Integrating 
quantitative data gathered from large-scale surveys with qualitative data gathered to gain 
semantic and conceptual insights would reduce these limitations. Finally, this exploration of 
survey data contributes to the mounting evidence55 that it is problematic to assume that all 
citizens who invoke ‘democracy’ want the same thing: while ‘demand for democracy’ remains 
strong across the globe, it is far from clear that people, policy makers and scholars mean the 
same thing  by it. Indeed, over the past decade the political debate around the definition, quality 
and ‘content of democracy has intensified across the globe, including in established 
democracies:56 while liberal democracy’s procedural institutions (e.g. elections) appear unable 
to produce governments responsive to citizens’ needs,57 and decreasing voter turn-out and the 
re-emergence of populism signal disillusion with ‘really existing democracy,’ recent waves of 
popular protest are either compatible with democracy (e.g. the Arab uprisings) or explicitly call 
for it (e.g. the Occupy movements or Spain’s Indignados, whose slogan was precisely 
¡democracia real ya!, real democracy now). Without these refinements, and without attention 
to the local social, political and economic contexts within which respondents interpret and 
answer questions,58 our analyses of crucial issues such as the understanding of and relationship 
between ‘democracy’ and ‘Islam’ will necessarily remain limited.
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Figure 1: Elections, political rights, socio-economic rights and ‘clean’ government as 
one of the two most important characteristics of democracy, %  
Figure 2: % Prioritising Economic Rights over Political and Civil Rights as an Essential 
Characteristic of Democracy 
Figure 3: Political system preference in principle, % of respondents 
Figure 4: Demand for Law being based on Shari’a, % respondents 
Figure 5: Attitudes to Women’s Educational, Employment and Political Rights, % 
Figure 6: 
Percentage agreeing type of government suitable, or very suitable for country 
 
Figure 7: 
Agree that the Constitution should guarantee political and civil rights 
Figure 8:  
Political and Civil Rights Guaranteed to a Great Extent in 2015, % 
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